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Source: *Sociometry*, Jun., 1977, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1977), pp. 161-177

Published by: American Sociological Association

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3033519>

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The Three Faces of Social Psychology *

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The current "crisis" of social psychology largely reflects the division of the field into three increasingly isolated domains or faces: (1) psychological social psychology, (2) symbolic interactionism, and (3) psychological sociology (or social structure and personality). A sociology of knowledge analysis suggests that the distinctive substantive and methodological concerns of each face reflect the intellectual and institutional contexts in which it developed. Psychological social psychology has increasingly focused on individual psychological processes in relation to social stimuli using laboratory experiments; symbolic interactionism, on face-to-face interaction processes using naturalistic observations; and psychological sociology, on the relation of macrosocial structures and processes to individual psychology and behavior, most often using survey methods. Brief critical discussion of the faces indicates that the strengths of each complement weaknesses in the others, highlighting a need for more interchange among them. Psychological sociology receives special emphasis because it currently lacks the coherence and clear identity of the other faces, yet is essential to a well-rounded social psychology since it balances the increasingly microsocial emphases of the other faces. Although diagnosis does not guarantee cure, this paper aims to promote modification of the very faces and trends it depicts.

The expansion of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* from one volume in 1935 to two volumes in 1954 and five volumes by 1968-69 reflects the rapid growth of the broad interdisciplinary field of social psychology (Murchison, 1935; Lindzey, 1954; Lindzey and Aronson, 1968-69). Yet this quantitative success has been accompanied by growing dissatisfaction with the state of the field, though the reasons for such dissatisfaction vary. Some, mainly psychological social psychologists, have worried that social psychological work has become too narrow and specialized (cf. Katz, 1972; McGuire, 1973; and the *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 1976a, 1976b), while others, mainly sociological social psychologists, have worried that social psychology has become too widely diffused and hence dissipated (cf. Liska, 1977a, 1977b; Archibald, 1977; Burgess, 1977; Hewitt, 1977; and Hill, 1977).

Each of these concerns is valid with

respect to some portion of the total field of social psychology. However, these analyses are themselves illustrative of a larger and more serious problem which will be the focus of this paper—the fractionation of social psychology into three increasingly distinct and isolated domains or faces, here termed: (1) psychological social psychology, (2) symbolic interactionism, and (3) psychological sociology (or social structure and personality). *Psychological social psychology* refers to the mainstream of social psychology within the discipline of psychology, which has increasingly focused on psychological processes in relation to social stimuli, using laboratory experiments, and which is embodied institutionally, for example, in the American Psychological Association's Division 8 and *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. *Symbolic interactionism*, often considered the sociological variant of social psychology, is characterized by the study of face-to-face social interaction via naturalistic observation. *Psychological sociology* refers to another sociological variant of social psychology which relates macrosocial phenomena (e.g., organizations, societies, and aspects of the social structures and processes thereof) to individuals' psychological attributes and behavior, usually using quantitative but nonexperimental

* For their reading and constructive critiques of earlier drafts, I am indebted to Kurt Back, Philip Brickman, Richard Cohn, Wendy Fisher House, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Alan Kerckhoff, Lawrence R. Landerman, Jeanne McGee, Theodore Newcomb, Morris Rosenberg, and Edward Tiryakian; and to the editor and anonymous referees of *Sociometry*. I am also grateful to Valerie Hawkins and Louise Rochelle for preparing the manuscript.

(often survey) methods. Except for the topics they research and teach, psychological sociologists and symbolic interactionists are largely indistinguishable from sociologists in general.¹ However, symbolic interactionists have informally constituted a relatively cohesive intellectual group, have been disproportionately represented in the contents and editorial boards of certain journals (e.g., *Sociological Quarterly*, *Social Problems*), and recently have organized a formal Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction.²

This paper seeks briefly to establish that there are indeed three identifiable and distinctive faces of social psychology (which constitute a reasonably exhaustive and mutually exclusive set), to show that each has its distinctive substantive and methodological foci, to critically discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each, and to show that one domain's weaknesses are complemented by the strengths of another. Our analysis suggests that the cur-

rent "crisis" of social psychology is not so much that each face has its flaws, but that each is at present largely unaware of, or uninterested in, the concerns of the others. Their mutual insularity impedes the intellectual and scientific development of each, and of social psychology as a whole. Thus, one major purpose of this paper is to facilitate greater interchange among the three domains, first by merely making each more aware of the existence and nature of the others, and second by suggesting specific ways in which such interchange would be mutually beneficial.

A second major purpose is to utilize a sociology (or really social psychology) of knowledge perspective to understand how social psychology came to have three faces, and why each has developed as it has. This perspective suggests that both the divisions between the faces and the particular substantive and methodological nature of each face largely reflect the intellectual and institutional contexts in which each developed, rather than purely intellectual or scientific imperatives. Special attention is given to psychological sociology both because it lacks the widely recognized identity and associated institutional structures which characterize the other two faces, and because its focus on the relation between macrosocial phenomena and individual psychology is critically necessary to balance the increasingly microsocial emphases of the other two faces. Thus, the present paper seeks to promote greater identification of work and workers in psychological sociology with one another and with the field of social psychology as a whole.

The forces creating three isolated, at times antagonistic, faces of social psychology have been operative for over 50 years. The current fractionation and "crisis" of social psychology is, therefore, less surprising than the wholeness and great progress which characterized social psychology in the period from just before World War II to the early 1960s. World War II produced a coalescence and acceleration of certain trends in social psychology by involving a large number of social psychologists in truly interdisciplinary programs of research on military and civilian behavior and morale utilizing a

¹ The American Sociological Association has a single Social Psychology Section which disbanded once for lack of member interest and commitment. It also has a single major social psychological journal, *Sociometry*, the content of which has recently become increasingly indistinguishable from the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. That is, work exemplifying symbolic interactionism and psychological sociology usually appears in general sociology journals (e.g., the *American Sociological Review*), rather than in *Sociometry* or other specifically social psychological journals.

² Institutional or professional affiliation and even personal self-definition are useful, but imperfect, guides for classifying persons or works as social psychological or for categorizing them in terms of the three faces of social psychology delineated here. Some members of psychology departments do research that is really psychological sociology, and conversely some nominal sociologists are really psychological social psychologists. Any work which examines the relationship between individual psychological attributes and social structures, situations, and/or environments constitutes, in my view, social psychology. Thus, a good deal of social psychology is done by persons who identify themselves as psychologists or sociologists but not as social psychologists, and also by persons identified with the other social science disciplines. The emphasis here is on typifying three broad areas of social psychology and assigning people or works to each in terms of their intellectual, rather than their institutional, positions. It may be noted that Back quite independently arrived at an analogous trichotomy for classifying social science methodologies (cf., Back, unpublished).

wide range of methods. One product was the seminal multi-volume series of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Stouffer *et al.* 1949–50); another was the creation immediately after World War II of major centers of graduate training in social psychology which were interdisciplinary in their formal organization (e.g., at Michigan and Harvard) or in their informal structure and orientation (e.g., at Yale, Berkeley, and Columbia). Beginning in the 1950s and culminating in the late 1960s, however, the forces tending to fractionate social psychology came to the fore once more. This trend, we will see, has had deleterious consequences not only for social psychology as a whole but also for developments within each of its three faces. Social psychology is unlikely to recapture the (perhaps somewhat illusory) wholeness of the decade or so after World War II; what is now needed is balanced development of each of the three faces to which we turn, and more satisfactory interchange between them.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The label “social psychology” is most commonly applied to, and probably most semantically appropriate for, the tradition of social psychology within psychology, the emphases of which are closely intertwined with those of its parent discipline. The substantive focus is on individual psychological processes—perception, cognition, motivation, learning, attitude formation and change, etc.—as they operate in relation to social stimuli and situations. This primary emphasis on psychological processes is reflected in definitions of the field in social psychology texts authored by psychologists at least from the time of Floyd Allport (1924):

I believe that only within the individual can we find the behavior mechanisms and consciousness which are fundamental in the interactions between individuals . . . There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals . . . Psychology in all its branches is a science of the individual. (pp. vi, 4)

More recently, a definitive and sophisticated text of this tradition defines social

psychology as the “subdiscipline of psychology that especially involves the *scientific study of the behavior of individuals as a function of social stimuli*” (Jones and Gerard, 1967:1). Methodologically, psychological social psychology embodies the tradition of *experimental, behavioral research* which has increasingly characterized all of psychology since the 1920s. Jones and Gerard (1967:58) aptly describe the conceptual paradigm of such experiments as S-[O]-R: stimuli (S) are varied and *behavioral* responses (R) are observed in order to make *inferences* about the psychological nature and processes of the “organism” (O) or person.

These basic emphases on psychological processes and experimental method characterized the work of Kurt Lewin, who by virtue of the influence of his ideas and students constitutes the leading founder of modern psychological social psychology. However, Lewin’s work was also animated by commitments to the social relevance and applicability of social psychological theories and experiments—expressed in his conception of “action research”—and to the study of small group dynamics as a crucial mediating link between individuals and larger social environments (e.g., Lewin, 1947). These latter emphases in Lewin’s work made psychological social psychology during the 1940s and 1950s much more “social” than it was in Floyd Allport’s day or has been in recent years, and hence also less clearly distinct from the bodies of social psychological work discussed below. But since Lewin’s immediate influence began to wane in the late 1950s, social psychology within psychology has drifted increasingly away from concern with real-life settings and problems, and even away from the study of groups (Steiner, 1973), toward increasingly “basic” laboratory research on psychological processes of college students, often in minimally social situations.³

³ Lewin was not the only force making psychological social psychology more social during this period. Gardner Murphy at Columbia imparted a broad interdisciplinary orientation and concern for application of social psychology to a number of students who took degrees with him in the late 1920s and early 1930s and went on to have a major impact on the

This drift has been clearly evident in content analyses of major journals of psychological social psychology—the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (JPSP), the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* (JESP), the *Journal of Personality*, and even the *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* (JASP) which was created to counter the trend away from socially relevant research. For example, reviewing and extending the work of Fried, *et al.* (1973), Helmreich (1975) shows that laboratory experiments constitute a large, and perhaps still growing, proportion of all research in JPSP, JESP, and JASP—84%, 85% and 63% respectively by 1974; and the majority of nonlaboratory studies were still field experiments. Similarly, college students were the subjects in 87%, 74% and 62% of all studies appearing in 1974 in JESP, JPSP, and JASP, respectively.

This expanding body of research has been increasingly criticized by some psychological social psychologists as often narrow, trivial, and of limited scientific as well as social value (e.g., Ring, 1967; Katz, 1972; McGuire, 1973; Gergen, 1973; Helmreich, 1975). The critics generally recommend greater use of nonexperimental methodologies to study more applied and/or “real-life” phenomena. The validity of these criticisms and proposed remedies has been extensively debated within this face of social psychology, but the concrete effects, if any, of this debate are still unclear (cf. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 1976a, 1976b).

Knowledge of basic psychological processes in relation to social stimuli is clearly necessary to adequate understanding of all social psychological phenomena; but it is not sufficient. Similarly, experiments are one important methodological

tool, but not the only one. The recent body of research on psychological social psychology clearly neglects the ongoing social context in which all human behavior occurs. The common and continued use of college student populations and the total absence of scientific sampling reflect an assumption that the responses and psychological processes being studied are universal human characteristics; hence any human being is presumably as good as any other for such research. However, this assumption is contradicted by studies showing marked variation in psychological processes across social groups (e.g., Converse, 1964). Further, although this assumption could be tested even in laboratory studies, it seldom is—even the effects of individual differences within the college population (e.g., in personality traits, sex, place of residence) are generally ignored or viewed as nuisance factors (cf. Carlson, 1971; Levenson *et al.*, 1976). Further, while real-world social actors are enmeshed in ongoing networks of social relations and positions, experimental “subjects” are first-time acquaintances (of the experimenter and/or each other) behaving in novel, often artificial, roles and situations. In sum, the problem of external validity—the ability to generalize findings to other persons, situations, and times—is ignored while great effort and resources are expended to enhance internal validity—the ability to draw causal inferences about what happened in the particular study situation.⁴

Such a body of knowledge will be of little ultimate value unless it can be proven relevant to social psychological phenomena outside the laboratory. Such relevance need not be immediately demonstrated for every experimental study or program of studies, but it must be periodically explored and tested. A

field, e.g., Theodore Newcomb, Rensis Likert, and Muzafer Sherif. Even at Yale University, which was a bastion of the experimental-behavioral approach, Carl I. Hovland emphasized the relevance of experimental and nonexperimental research to each other and of both to applied problems (e.g., Hovland, 1959). But from the late 1950s on, Lewin's student Leon Festinger and his students at departments like Minnesota, Stanford, and North Carolina came to dominate this face and turn it in increasingly psychological, experimental, and behavioral directions.

⁴ McGuire (1973), Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969) and others also suggest that the preoccupation with internal validity may be paradoxically self-defeating. The one “real” social relationship in the experimental situation (experimenter-subject) may affect the results as much or more than the often elaborately contrived social situations and stimuli, as subjects try to help and/or hinder the experimenter who may be simultaneously but unknowingly influencing the behavior of the subject in subtle and unintended ways.

hallmark of the Lewinian heyday of the 1940s and 1950s was the continual interplay between laboratory and field (both experimental and nonexperimental) research. For example, principles of group dynamics derived from laboratory research were explored and tested, often by the same researchers, in real life groups within schools, work organizations, the military, etc. (cf. Cartwright and Zander, 1960). Such cross-fertilization of "basic and applied" (or laboratory and field) research was stimulating and productive for both. Such cross-fertilization is increasingly infrequent, however, as psychological social psychology becomes more and more isolated both from those areas of psychology with less emphasis on laboratory experiments (e.g., clinical, personality, developmental, organizational) and from the other, largely nonexperimental, social sciences. This isolation is reflected in the relatively limited knowledge that even those self-critical psychological social psychologists have of other areas, especially those outside of psychology. Thus, they are prone to believe their "crisis" can be solved by adopting a few techniques (e.g., path analysis) from other disciplines and taking up "applied" topics. With others, I am dubious of the likely success of such efforts (e.g., Proshansky, 1976; Altman, 1976; Thorngate, 1976), unless they involve really coming to grips with the full range of substantive and methodological concerns of other disciplines and approaches.

THE TWO FACES OF SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social psychology has long constituted a major area of specialization within the discipline of sociology, but one which has been less intellectually and organizationally secure and coherent than its counterpart within the discipline of psychology. Whereas psychological social psychology gradually differentiated itself as a subfield within an already fairly-well established discipline, the genesis and growth of sociological social psychology has been inextricably linked with, and hence affected by, the genesis and growth of sociology itself. Although, as discussed

more fully below, social psychological issues were central to the concerns of the leading early sociologists in both Europe and America, beginning with Durkheim many sociologists felt compelled to justify the existence of sociology as a separate academic discipline and hence to emphasize how sociological concerns were different and distinct from those of psychology. This sociologism has not only reinforced the natural desire of social psychologists within sociology to differentiate themselves and their work from psychological social psychology; it has also forced them to defend themselves against the charge of not being really, or sufficiently, "sociological."⁵

A potent sociological social psychology emerged during the 1920s and 1930s as a more "social" alternative to the quite psychological and experimental social psychology of Floyd Allport and others. George Herbert Mead, the leading theorist of the symbolic interactionist variant of sociological social psychology, was endeavoring to provide just such an alternative:

We are not in social psychology building up the behavior of the social group in terms of the behavior of the separate individuals composing it, rather we are starting out with a given social whole of complex group activity, into which we analyze (as elements) the behavior of each of the separate individuals composing it. (Mead, 1934:7)

For a time the symbolic interactionism of Mead and others like Charles Horton Cooley and W. I. Thomas constituted the core of a somewhat unified and cohesive sociological social psychology which, especially in its analysis of the nature and development of the self, intersected in significant and fruitful ways with both psychological social psychology and other segments of sociology. Symbolic interactionism became the theoretical perspective not only of Mead's students (who

⁵ Tiryakian (1962:11) offers the following definition of "sociologism" (taken from the 1933 *Larousse*) which is consistent with the understanding of the term here: "... the view point of those sociologists who, making sociology a science completely irreducible to psychology, consider it as necessary and sufficient for the total explanation of social reality."

formed the "Chicago school" discussed in some detail below) but also of sociologists such as Manford Kuhn (e.g., 1964) at the University of Iowa, and Arnold Rose (e.g., 1962) at the University of Minnesota. Its influence was also apparent among more psychological social psychologists (e.g., Newcomb, 1950) and among psychiatrists (e.g., Sullivan, 1953).

However, in the period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, sociologism reached its highwater mark, at least in American sociology. This development put sociological social psychologists on the defensive and produced two kinds of reactions. Some, especially the dominant Chicago school of symbolic interactionists (e.g., Blumer, 1956), responded by criticizing developments in mainstream or "structural" (Stokes and Hewitt, 1976) sociology and affirming both the distinctiveness and validity of their social psychological approach to sociology. In contrast, others (e.g., Inkeles, 1959) tried to document the inherently social psychological nature of much mainstream sociology from Durkheim onward, and hence to legitimate and stimulate social psychological concerns within mainstream sociology. This second reaction represents a reemergence of what is here termed "psychological sociology" as a third face of social psychology with substantive and methodological emphases different from both symbolic interactionism and psychological social psychology, at least as these faces were developing from the late 1950s onward. In sum, just at the time that psychological social psychology was becoming narrower and more insular, sociological social psychology divided into two quite distinct domains which have also become increasingly isolated from each other as well as from psychological social psychology. Let us turn now to a more detailed discussion of the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of these two sociological faces.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

The term "symbolic interactionism" was first used by Herbert Blumer (1937) to describe the body of thought which originated with pragmatic philosophers such as

William James and John Dewey and was constituted as a sociological social psychology mainly by George Herbert Mead (1934), who was himself a pragmatic philosopher at the University of Chicago. Mead especially influenced a group of colleagues and students from the Chicago Sociology Department (e.g., Blumer, Thomas, Everett Hughes) who, with their students, have since become identified as the "Chicago school" of symbolic interactionism.⁶ This face derives its name from its emphasis on understanding how individuals interact with each other using symbols. Blumer, following Mead, identifies the essential elements of symbolic interactionism:

(T)hat human society is made up of individuals who have selves (that is, make indications to themselves); that individual action is a *construction* and not a release, being built up by the individual through noting and *interpreting* features of the situations in which he acts; that group or collective action consists of the aligning of individual actions, brought about by individuals' *interpreting* or taking into account each other's actions. (Blumer, 1962:184; emphasis added)⁷

⁶ The Chicago school's symbolic interactionism is now clearly the dominant version of this face of social psychology (cf., Meltzer and Petras, 1970), though as noted above Kuhn and Rose were other major figures in this domain during their lifetimes. Though the work of Kuhn, Rose, and some others such as Rosenberg (1965) or Stryker (e.g., Schwartz and Stryker, 1971) may be symbolic interactionist in substance, it differs from that of the Chicago school in emphasizing quantitative empirical methods and deductive theoretical processes as opposed to the "qualitative" observational methods and inductive theoretical approach stressed by the Chicago school. The general dominance of members of the Chicago school is reflected in their greater numbers, occupancy of prestigious positions in the profession, quantity of publication, and authorship of the major symbolic interactionist textbooks (i.e., Shibutani, 1961; Lindesmith, *et al.*, 1975a). Even the Chicago school is somewhat diverse in its views, but Blumer constitutes probably the most central figure after Mead himself and is used as a key source here along with the major symbolic interactionist textbook (Lindesmith, *et al.*, 1975a). Symbolic interactionism has affinities with the new sociological area of "ethnomethodology," but Lindesmith *et al.*, (1975a:20-25) quite properly stress that these two points of view are by no means identical.

⁷ The term "make indications" is not intrinsically clear. Blumer (1962:181) discusses the idea as follows: "in declaring that the human being has a self, Mead had in mind chiefly that the human being can

This brief summary clearly suggests the major substantive emphases of symbolic interactionism.

First, people *interpret* the world to themselves: Meaning is not inherent in the people or objects that a human being confronts and perceives, but rather meaning is given to these people and objects by the person perceiving them. Similarly, behavior is not an automatic reaction to given stimuli, but rather a creative construction growing out of a person's interpretation of the situation and others in it. Further, there is a considerable and irreducible amount of indeterminacy or unpredictability in human behavior because human beings create meaning and action in ways that can never be perfectly predicted from knowledge of antecedent characteristics of the person and/or situation. Finally, the interpretation of situations and the construction of behavior are *processes* occurring in the context of human interaction, which must be studied as such and not reduced to a set of relationships between static structural variables. Thus, to understand social life is to understand the *processes* through which individuals *interpret* situations and *construct* their actions with respect to each other.

Symbolic interactionist theory and research have focused on aspects of social life where this process of cognitive interpretation and behavioral construction are most evident and important. These include processes of face-to-face interaction (e.g., Goffman, 1959; 1971; Glaser and Strauss, 1964), socialization and especially the development of the self (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Kinch, 1963; Turner, 1962), the learning and definition of deviant behavior through interpersonal processes (e.g., Becker, 1953; Scheff, 1966), and collective behavior (e.g., Blumer, 1951;

Turner, 1964). These topics essentially constitute the contents of major symbolic interactionist texts and readers, with the primary emphasis in all cases on face-to-face interaction and socialization (e.g., Shibutani, 1961; Manis and Meltzer, 1972; Lindesmith *et al.*, 1975a, 1975b; and Hewitt, 1976).

In their empirical work symbolic interactionists of the Chicago school have relied almost exclusively on the methodology of participant (and sometimes non-participant) observation coupled with informal interviewing, while actively eschewing experimental and/or quantitative nonexperimental methods. Although these symbolic interactionists see quantitative experimental and nonexperimental methods as useful for some purposes, they clearly feel these methods are not appropriate to the central issues of symbolic interactionism which are, in their view, also the central issues in any adequate social psychology of human life (e.g., Blumer, 1956; Lindesmith, *et al.*, 1957a:31–59):

... the process of symbolic interaction requires the student to catch the process of interpretation through which [people] construct their actions. This process is not to be caught merely by turning to conditions which are antecedent to the process. . . . Nor can one catch the process merely by inferring its nature from the overt action which is its product. *To catch the process, the student must take the role of the acting unit whose behavior he is studying.* (Blumer, 1962:188; emphasis added)

Thus, there is a strong tendency to discount and hence ignore on methodological grounds much of the work constituting the other two faces of social psychology.

Both the strengths and weaknesses of symbolic interactionism stem from its having developed concurrently with, and partially in reaction to, the more radical tendencies toward behaviorism in psychology since the 1920s and sociologism in sociology since Durkheim. For many years symbolic interactionists have provided eloquent, convincing, and sometimes lonely, critiques of the view that human social life (1) could be adequately understood in terms of stimulus-response relationships involving little or no cogni-

be the object of his own actions. He can act toward himself as he might act toward others This mechanism enables the human being to make indication to himself of things in his surroundings and thus to guide his actions by what he notes. Anything of which a human being is conscious is something which he is indicating to himself" The key points are that the person can take himself as an object, interact with himself, and perceive and interpret to himself the objects and events in his environment.

tive mediation (behaviorism) and/or (2) could be understood without even taking into account the intentions, needs, or beliefs of individuals (sociologism). However, in rejecting these intellectual positions symbolic interactionism has also tended to reject, or at least neglect, a variety of other ideas (e.g., quantification and other aspects of "scientific method" such as causal theorizing; macrosocial concepts and phenomena) which have been temporally associated, *but not inextricably or causally linked*, with these positions. In so doing, it has become isolated from many parallel developments in other areas of social psychology. For example, Lewin's field theory and its antecedents in Gestalt psychology strongly emphasized the role of cognitive mediation or interpretation in human social behavior, though Lewin preferred quantitative and experimental methods for studying these phenomena (cf. Deutsch and Krauss, 1965:14-77). Similarly, "structurally" and quantitatively oriented sociologists (e.g., Inkeles, 1959, 1963) have argued convincingly that Durkheim's assertion that social facts can be explained only in terms of other social facts is not only generally fallacious but also is belied by Durkheim's own work. Thus both behaviorism and sociologism have been rejected by major figures in the other domains of social psychology, yet symbolic interactionist writings take little note of these developments, much less of their implications for symbolic interactionist theory and methods.

In essence, symbolic interactionism has thrown out the baby with the bath water. In rejecting radical behaviorism and sociologism for good reasons, symbolic interactionists have also largely forsaken quantitative methodology and macrosocial phenomena without good reason. Lewin's field theoretical tradition clearly demonstrates that many, if not all, of the phenomena of central interest to symbolic interactionism can be studied with the theoretical and methodological tools of more conventional science. Similarly, it is possible to study macrosocial structural phenomena and processes without embracing sociologism. Yet although symbolic interactionists profess that their

work can be macrosocial, it largely has not been—the content of major texts and readers, for example, hardly strays from microsocial processes of face-to-face interaction, though some of this is of course relevant to more macrosocial structures and processes (e.g., Manis and Meltzer, 1972; Lindesmith *et al.*, 1975a, 1975b). Naturalistic observation of real-life microsocial processes, like experimental analysis of psychological processes, is clearly an essential part of social psychology, but it becomes insular and sterile without interchange with the other substantive and methodological positions.

Despite their wide divergences, psychological social psychology and symbolic interactionism share a common flaw—neither adequately considers how and why macrosocial structures and processes affect, and are affected by, psychological processes and face-to-face interaction. This lack of attention to more macrosocial issues is perhaps the crux of the current "crisis" in these more widely recognized faces of social psychology. Yet these issues are the substantive focus of a tradition of research and theory that has until now been only loosely identified as, or with, social psychology.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY (OR SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY)

A major purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a large body of theory and research on the relation of macrosocial structures (e.g., organizations, occupations, "social classes," religion, type of community) and processes (urbanization, industrialization, social mobility) to individual psychological attributes and behavior constitutes an important and coherent third face of social psychology. This tradition of social psychology cross-cuts all of the social sciences, but is especially important in sociology and is hence termed psychological sociology (which is analogous to what others term "social structure and personality"). This third face shares the "real-world" concerns of symbolic interactionism but puts much greater emphasis on both macrosocial structural concepts and quantitative em-

pirical methods; it shares psychological social psychology's emphasis on "scientific" and quantitative methods but focuses on more macrosocial, "real-life" phenomena using, of necessity, largely nonexperimental methods.

Whatever its intellectual merits, however, psychological sociology lacks the symbolic and institutional attributes which give identity to social psychology's other faces—it has neither a widely accepted name, nor textbooks which coherently present its substantive and methodological concerns, nor institutional embodiment in professional associations and journals. Thus, this body of work and workers has suffered from an "identity crisis," unable to adequately differentiate itself from the identity of its "parent" discipline (sociology) or to develop its own identity as a third face of social psychology. Psychological sociology had its origins in the development of modern sociology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but its development was severely stunted during the period (about 1910–1960) in which sociology was firmly established as a separate discipline. Since the 1940s a variety of forces have fostered a resurgence of work in this area, which deserves to be recognized as a reemerging third face of social psychology.

Although their work constitutes the foundation of modern sociology, social psychology was a central, if not *the* central concern of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. This has often been lost sight of due to tendencies of these writers, often accentuated by later interpreters, to stress the difference between their sociological approach and that of psychologists of their day. Max Weber especially articulated quite early what are still the central orientations of psychological sociology, but his impact in America was somewhat diminished by delays in translating his work into English. Like the symbolic interactionists, Weber (e.g., 1964:88–115) stressed the necessity of understanding the subjective interpretations of situations (or meanings) which underlie individuals' behavior; but he felt that such "interpretive understanding of social action" could be scientific in the

same way as the natural sciences, that is, expressed in probabilistic causal theories and developed and verified through many forms of empirical research—not only participant observation, but also experiments, and qualitative and quantitative nonexperimental procedures:

Sociology . . . is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. . . . For verifiable accuracy of the meaning of a phenomenon, it is a great help to be able to put one's self imaginatively in the place of the actor and thus sympathetically to participate in his experiences, but this is not an essential condition of meaningful interpretation. . . . [Empirical] Verification is feasible with relative accuracy only in the few very special cases susceptible to psychological experimentation. The approach to a satisfactory degree of accuracy is exceedingly various, even in the limited number of cases of mass phenomena which can be statistically described and unambiguously interpreted. For the rest there remains only the possibility of comparing the largest possible number of historical or contemporary processes which, while otherwise similar, differ in the one decisive point of their relation to the particular motive or factor the role of which is being investigated. . . . Action in the sense of subjectively understandable orientation of behavior exists only as the behavior of one or more *individual* human beings. (Weber, 1964:88, 90, 97, 101)

Weber (e.g., 1964:101–107) specifically characterized functional analyses which treated social collectivities as units without reference to the individuals composing them as useful but incomplete. But he also felt that meaningful social action occurred only in social contexts, and his interests were in understanding social action in quite macrosocial contexts via inter-societal comparisons. His most famous work—*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 1958)—is a classic of psychological sociology which has stimulated a variety of modern work on the role of individual values and motives (religiously derived or otherwise) in economic behavior and social change (cf. McClelland, 1961; Lenski, 1963; Brown, 1965:Ch. 9).

Recognition of Karl Marx as a psychological sociologist has also been impeded

by delays in the publication and then translation of his earliest work, especially *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* in which Marx first developed his concept of "alienation," or alienated labor (cf. Fromm, 1961). Like Durkheim's concept of anomie, Marx's concept of alienation has "multiple reference to: (1) social phenomena (states of society, its institutions, rules and norms); (2) individual states of mind (beliefs, desires, attitudes, etc.); (3) a hypothesized empirical relationship between (1) and (2); and (4) a presupposed picture of the 'natural' relationship between (1) and (2)" (Lukes, 1967:140). Thus, Marx saw the structural position of workers in the capitalist economic system as incompatible with the realization of human beings' basic productive natures; the consequences of this were both psychological and social malaise and discontent. Erich Fromm (1961:69-79) effectively argues that a variety of sources, from Soviet ideologists to American sociologists, have erred in suggesting that these social psychological interests of the "young" Marx were left behind and even repudiated by the "old" Marx in favor of a more structural analysis presented in *Capital*. The Frankfurt School in Germany, which also provided the stimulus for an American social psychological classic—*The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950), had earlier noted and defended the centrality of social psychological concerns throughout Marx's thought. In the fifteen or so years since the translation of Marx's early work into English, his social psychological concerns have received increasing theoretical (e.g., Etzioni, 1968; Israel, 1971) and empirical (e.g., Blauner, 1964) attention, though empirical research has often reflected Marx's theoretical concerns very imperfectly, if at all (cf. Horton, 1964).

Durkheim had the greatest impact on the early development of sociology as a discipline, and his ambivalence toward mixing the psychological and sociological is the source of the major forces which stunted the growth of psychological sociology. Durkheim is probably best known for his insistence on the distinctive nature of sociological phenomena and on

their functional explanation in terms of other social phenomena:

We arrive . . . at the following principle: *The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness . . . The function of a social fact ought always to be sought in its relation to some social end.* (Durkheim, 1950:110-111)

His most widely known work, *Suicide*, sought to demonstrate that rates of an inherently individual behavior can and must be explained in social terms and without recourse to psychological factors: "The social suicide rate can be explained only sociologically" (Durkheim, 1951:299). In fact, almost all of Durkheim's work, including *Suicide*, is inherently social psychological (cf. Inkeles, 1959, 1963; Tiryakian, 1962); and Durkheim himself recognized this explicitly as well as implicitly. Less than fifteen pages after asserting that he had explained suicide purely sociologically he notes: "We see no objection to calling sociology a variety of psychology, if we carefully add that social psychology has its own laws which are not those of individual psychology" (Durkheim, 1951:312). His studies of religion and morality (e.g., Durkheim, 1948), which were the central core of his work, constitute classic initial contributions to psychological sociology (cf. Tiryakian, 1962).

Thus Durkheim, the originator of sociologism, really sought only to ensure that social facts were recognized and treated as things *sui generis* and not reductionistically derived from psychological facts and principles. In battling the widespread psychologism of his time he often espoused a radical sociologism (cf. Inkeles, 1959), but he also fully recognized that the phenomena which interested him could be adequately understood only by what is here termed psychological sociology. In their efforts to establish sociology as a discipline in its own right, however, many successors to Durkheim took his sociologism too literally. Thus, sociology came to be dominated in the period from 1920 to about 1960 by forms of structural-functional analysis (e.g., in human ecology, formal organizations, stratification) which ruled psychological phenomena

outside the purview of sociology. The sociologistic Durkheim, the later Marx, and Weber the student of authority and bureaucracy were remembered and revered, while the social psychological Durkheim, the early Marx, and Weber the advocate of "interpretive understanding of social action" were largely ignored, and along with them the fundamental concerns of psychological sociology.⁸

By the late 1940s, however, sociology was more securely established as a discipline. Sociologists had been drawn during World War II into studying a variety of social psychological problems (e.g., Stouffer *et al.*, 1949–50), and a new methodology developed—survey research—which allowed the study of the psychological attributes of large populations in relation to macrosocial structures and processes. These factors stimulated a gradual resurgence during the 1950s and 1960s of social psychological research in sociology using quantitative (generally survey) methods. By 1959 Inkeles (1959 and also 1963) could publish the closest thing to an extant programmatic statement for the study of "personality and social structure." Interestingly, however, Inkeles (1959:250, emphasis added) directed his statement toward using psychological

theories and data "to improve the scope and adequacy of *sociological* analysis." And significantly, he attempts to do this by example (1959, 1963) and in his own research (e.g., 1960, 1969) utilizing either ad hoc, common sense psychology or Freudian theory which by that time was little utilized in other domains of social psychology. Thus, Inkeles' heralding of the reemergence of psychological sociology did little to relate this third face of social psychology to the other two, but rather tried more to legitimate it as a component of mainstream sociology.

Research on personality and social structure or psychological sociology over the past two decades has largely taken the same tack, remaining closely integrated with mainstream sociology and only tangentially related to the other faces of social psychology. This orientation has been a source of both its strengths and its weaknesses. On the positive side, it has kept psychological sociology focused on the quantitative study of macrosocial phenomena—usually those of current interest to more purely sociological sociologists—in relation to psychological attributes and behavior of individuals. Thus, major examples of recent research in psychological sociology include studies of: (1) the impact of "social class" (and also "status" mobility and inconsistency) on self-image, personality, and values (e.g., Rosenberg, 1965; Kohn, 1969); (2) the reciprocal relation of "modernization" to individual personality and behavior (e.g., Inkeles, 1969; Portes, 1973); (3) the effect of urban residence on individual personality and behavior (e.g., Fischer, 1976); (4) the role of individual motivations and aspirations (and parental, peer, and teacher influence thereon) in the status-attainment process (e.g., Featherman, 1972; Sewell and Hauser, 1974; Kerckhoff, 1974); (5) the relation between personality and the performance of organizational roles (e.g., Merton, 1957; Kohn, 1969); and (6) the place of psychological factors in the political process (e.g., Sears, 1969).

But while the isolation of psychological sociology from the other faces of social psychology has strengthened its sociological component, it has also tended to im-

⁸ Both Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton, probably the most influential structural-functionalists and indeed sociologists of this formative period, resembled Durkheim in being more heavily social psychological than is often recognized. Both did important work in psychological sociology as well as in purer sociology. Merton's (e.g., 1957) work on both reference groups and "anomie" are major contributions to psychological sociology (cf. Deutsch and Krauss, 1965), as are Parsons' introduction of Weberian action theory into sociology and his contributions toward interdisciplinary study of social structure and personality (e.g., Parsons, 1937; 1964; and Parsons *et al.*, 1953). Yet I suspect that Parsons and Merton have always been most widely recognized for their "sociological" work, especially their contribution to "structural-functionalism." Merton and especially Parsons also contributed to another trend of the late 1940s to early 1960s which militated against social psychological work in sociology—the emphasis on basic theory and research with a consequent devaluation of "applied" work (e.g., on education, the family, etc.), much of which tends, of necessity, to include a healthy balance of both psychological and sociological concerns. As noted above the applied work done during World War II was a major stimulus to the development of social psychology, and such work will be noted below as one potential mechanism for interfacing the three faces of social psychology.

poverish it psychologically. The social structural positions of individuals are generally seen to "determine" or "shape" personality and behavior rather mechanically (and mysteriously). Little or no attention is paid to the microsocial interpersonal relations and/or psychological processes through which macrosocial structures come to have such effects. Such analysis is necessary not only to understand more fully how and why such influence occurs, but also, equally importantly, to understand the social and psychological conditions which may intensify or mitigate (even nullify) such influence and which may also serve as mechanisms through which individual personality and behavior react back on the social structure (cf. Levinson, 1959).

Psychological sociologists are beginning to take more seriously the task of explicating the relationship between structural positions and individual personality and behavior (cf. Elder, 1973), but such work has largely consisted of specifying the particular aspects of a broad macrosocial structure or process such as "class" or "modernization" which impinge on the individual. This is a highly useful and generally enlightening endeavour (cf. Inkeles, 1969; Kohn, 1969; Kerckhoff, 1974, for examples), but it leaves the interpersonal and psychological processes of influence still largely unanalyzed. The most egregious example of this is the moribund status of "role theory"—once viewed as the crucial link between the psychological and sociological levels of analysis (cf. Parsons, 1951; Rommetviet, 1955). Role theory stagnated because (despite numerous taxonomies of the nature, components, and interrelations of roles) the key issue of when and how social roles do and *do not* affect individual personality and behavior (or vice versa) has not been concerted and systematically addressed. A more specific example comes from the status-attainment area. A sizeable literature (e.g., Sewell and Hauser, 1974) has developed on the status attainment process and the role of significant others (e.g., parents, peers, and teachers) in it, yet I know of only one study (Kerckhoff and Huff, 1974) which considers how the quality of the relationships with these others

may affect the extent of their influence—a topic studied in great detail by psychological social (and developmental) psychologists. The chaotic state of research on status inconsistency, urbanism and personality, and many other areas, some of which are beginning to be clarified, reflects similar lack of attention to the crucial interpersonal psychological processes of influence.

In sum, the essential concerns of psychological sociology remain those defined by Weber, Marx, and Durkheim and reaffirmed by Inkeles (1959, 1963): understanding through ultimately quantitative research (1) how social structure comes to influence personality (cf. Elder, 1973); (2) how personality and social structure combine to determine socially consequential behaviors; and (3) how the "fit" between individual needs or abilities and structural demands affects individual and social functioning (cf. Etzioni, 1968). Adequate understanding of such phenomena requires understanding both of social structure and of microsocial interaction processes (i.e., symbolic interactionism) and socially relevant individual psychology (i.e., psychological social psychology).

INTERFACING THE THREE FACES?

To this point this paper has argued: (1) that in the last 20 years the broad field of social psychology has developed three increasingly separate faces; (2) that this separation weakens each of these faces as well as social psychology as a whole; (3) that the weaknesses of each face are complemented by the strengths of one or both of the others; and hence (4) that each face as well as social psychology as a whole, stands to benefit both substantively and methodologically from greater interchange between the faces. Yet whether and how such interchange can be achieved remains quite problematic.

To this end, renewed attention to the conditions which prevailed during and immediately after World War II may be instructive. As noted earlier, the war brought the skills of social psychologists (indeed, social scientists) from a wide range of perspectives and backgrounds to bear on *common phenomena or problems*,

all of which were seen as having some ultimate applied value. A similar orientation, which spilled over into graduate education, characterized major research topics in the immediate post-war period such as authoritarianism (Adorno *et al.*, 1950), conformity (e.g., Asch, 1958), communication and influence (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Hovland, 1959), group dynamics (Cartwright and Zander, 1960), and race relations (e.g., Williams, 1964). More recently, each face of social psychology has turned in upon itself, often being more interested in advancing its particular substantive and/or methodological concerns than in understanding major social phenomena or problems. Thus, a first step may be for social psychologists of all types to think less about the relation of their work to other work within their own domain of social psychology and to think more about how their work contributes toward understanding a specific social problem or phenomenon (cf. McGuire, 1973).

There is no lack of social phenomena or problems which merit investigation from a variety of perspectives. The true "crisis" of social psychology becomes glaringly manifest where two or more faces are already working on the same or very closely related issues, yet each is relatively unaware of, and/or unconcerned with, work in the others. For example, symbolic interactionists have studied the "labelling" of deviance (e.g., Scheff, 1966) largely without reference to the simultaneous development by psychological social psychologists of attribution theory, the central focus of which is to specify when responsibility for, or causes of, behavior will be attributed to the person versus external or environmental factors (cf. Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967). Similarly, attribution theorists have paid little attention to labelling theory. Whereas attribution theory has looked at the characteristics of the behavior and situation as the primary determinants of external vs. internal attribution, labelling theory has stressed the importance of the social characteristics of the actors and observers in determining labelling. Thus, in some ways the theories may be complementary; in others, contradictory. In any case, the ex-

tent of their mutual relevance ought to be carefully considered on both sides. Similar examples have been noted in the discussion of each of the three faces above.

Study of the effects of living in cities on individual psychology and behavior provides an example of how all three faces can contribute to, and benefit from, analyzing the same problem or phenomenon. Engaging in what is here termed psychological sociology, Wirth (1938) suggested that urban residence profoundly affected patterns of social organization and interaction (e.g., increasing "segmentalization" of human relationships), and hence individual psychology and behavior (e.g., increasing interpersonal indifference and personal loneliness). Population size, density, and heterogeneity were for Wirth the crucial attributes of cities which produced these effects. Wirth's ideas and related theories about the consequences of city life have been challenged and/or modified, on both empirical and theoretical grounds, by both symbolic interactionists (Gans, 1962) and psychological social psychologists (e.g., Freedman, 1975). Both implicitly or explicitly criticize Wirth and others for failing to adequately consider and specify the microsocial and psychological processes through which a city as a social or ecological structure comes to impinge on individuals—a failing which results in mistaken assumptions about the nature and/or effects of these processes.

From a symbolic interactionist perspective, Gans has argued that wherever they live, people construct social environments and networks for themselves and that similar types of people (in terms of life cycle stage, education, ethnicity, etc.) are likely to construct similar types of networks of significant others even though they live in different residential or ecological settings. Thus, the crucial determinants of individual psychology and behavior are networks of significant others which are much more a function of who people are than of the population size, density, or heterogeneity (or other characteristics) of the places where they live. Gans, however, provides no direct support for his views beyond impressionistic observations of city life, though subsequent analyses using survey data sup-

port many of his conclusions (Fischer, 1976). Similarly, Freedman (1975) has shown experimentally that physical crowding fails to produce many of the effects that Wirth and others posited, and suggests that people respond quite adaptively to such conditions.

We are just beginning to understand how and when living in cities vs. other places affects individual psychology and behavior, and cannot explore all the complexities here (cf., Fischer, 1976). Cities do have effects on individual psychology and behavior, but these effects are neither as simple nor as dramatic as Wirth and others have implied. What is important for our purposes is that the three faces of social psychology have all contributed to our current understanding of this issue and can do so further. What is also noteworthy, however, are the ways in which the insularity of the three faces remains apparent even in this area of common concern. Thus, the developing experimental literature including Freedman's (1975) work, often evinces more relation to the parallel literature on animals than to the relevant literature from psychological sociology and symbolic interactionism. Further, there is a strong tendency for crowding, which can be easily studied in the laboratory, to be taken by psychological social psychologists as the essential factor differentiating cities from other residential communities, when crowding is obviously only one small aspect of broad ecological or environmental social psychology (cf. Altman, 1976; Proshansky, 1976). Analogously, survey analyses by psychological sociologists generally do little more than assess urban-surburban-rural differences on some dependent variable with controls for a few basic demographic factors (e.g., age, education, race)—thus exemplifying all that Blumer (1956) criticized about "variable analysis." Meanwhile, Goffman (1971) and others have been developing symbolic interactionist analyses of behavior in different situations and environments, but these analyses intersect hardly at all with the potentially related work of psychological social psychologists and psychological sociologists.

In sum, this area well illustrates the

need for, and potential gains from, greater interchange between the three faces of social psychology. Such interchange is essential for fully adequate social psychological analyses of the effects of ecological and residential environments on the individual. Further, such interchange will help: (1) to provide psychological sociology with necessary microsocial and psychological sophistication, (2) to operationalize and test aspects of symbolic interactionism and to relate them to relevant structural and psychological concepts or theories, and (3) to enhance the external validity and relevance of current work within psychological social psychology while also opening new avenues for experimental investigation.

In many ways the development of three distinct faces of social psychology is a natural and even beneficial phenomenon and, in fact, this paper seeks to stimulate more distinct development of the third face (psychological sociology). But differentiation and specialization need not, and should not, mean isolation. The intellectual strengths and weaknesses of each domain, and of social psychology as a whole, clearly compel the three faces toward greater interchange. But the peculiar current and past intellectual and institutional contexts within which each exists and developed often have mitigated against such interchange. By clarifying their nature, the forces that shaped them, and the actual and potential relations between them, this paper seeks to facilitate individual and perhaps institutional efforts to establish new interfaces between the three faces of social psychology.

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